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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
WEST VALLEY CITY, 
Plaintiff-Appellee 
vs 
TERESA FOY, 
Defendant-Appellant 
APPELLANT'S 
REPLY BRIEF 
Argument Priority 15 
Case No. 2003-0503 
ORAL ARGUMENT REQUESTED 
APPELLANT'S REBUTTAL ARGUMENTS 
FOY'S "REQUEST FOR HEARING" WAS TIMELY FILED 
ISSUES RAISED FOR THE FIRST TIME ON APPEAL 
SHOULD NOT BE CONSIDERED 
The Appellee CITY asserts [pp. 13-17 of APPELLEE'S 
BRIEF] that the "request for hearing" was not timely. 
The Appellee further acknowledges in Footnote #2 on 
page 14 of APPELLEE'S BRIEF that 
"for an unknown reason, both Foy's counsel and 
the City' s counsel below adopted October 30th, 
1997 as the due date for the request for 
hearing." 
Emphasis added. That is exactly correct! Such i.e. 
that the "request" was due on or before October 3 0th 
was adopted by the CITY early in the litigation. See 
CITY'S Memorandum of Law in Support of Motion for 
Summary Judgment, 115, RECORD at 000035]. The CITY'S 
position that the "request" document WAS TIMELY 
l 
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RECEIVED was never abandoned nor retreated from BY 
THE CITY'S TRIAL COUNSEL during the entirety of the 5-
year litigation in the trial court. Indeed, as recently 
as the final 13 January 2 0 03 "summary judgment" 
hearing the hearing at which the CITY finally 
obtained the "summary judgment" the CITY'S trial 
counsel (Mr Lawrence) acknowledged during his arguments 
before the Court: 
Mr. LAWRENCE: . . • Ms. Foy now argues that a 
letter which the City received which we 
acknowledge receiving and we acknowledge 
receiving it within the time period but it was 
from a person named Kay Cooper, supposed a 
tenant on the property. 
See Transcript of Summary Judgment Hearing, 13 January 
2003, page 2, line 8 through page 3, line 3. Emphasis 
added. RECORD at 000732-000733. 
Later during that same 13 January 2003 "summary 
judgment hearing" Mr LAWRENCE stated: 
Mr LAWRENCE: . . . I believe it was October 
28th or 29th which was within the ten day 
period for her to respond. Within that ten day 
period the City received a letter signed by 
someone named K. Cooper, the initial "K". 
See Transcript of 13 January 2 0 03 Summary Judgment 
Hearing, page 23, lines 8 through 19. Emphasis added. 
RECORD at 000753 . 
Principles of "estoppel" and "waiver" now PRECLUDE 
the CITY from now asserting as its "appellate 
counsel" now does that the "request for hearing" was 
untimely. Similarly, the CITY should be estopped from 
asserting the claimed untimeliness of the "request" by 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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reason of the CITY'S uncooperative resistance to any 
and all "pre-trial discovery" on the issue. 
To raise the "untimeliness" issue now for THE 
FIRST TIME which the "footnoted" text from APPELLEE'S 
BRIEF implicitly recognizes when the case is now "on 
appeal" goes clearly against long- standing precedent. 
Arguments which have not been raised before the trial 
court are not preserved and will be considered when 
raised for the first time on appeal. Dansie vs Anderson 
Lumber Company, 878 P. 2d 1155 (Utah Court of Appeals 
1994) ; Wurst vs Department of Employment Security, 818 
P. 2d 1036 (Utah Court of Appeals 1991) ; Olson vs Park-
Craig-Olson, Incorporated, 815 P.2d 1356 (Utah Court of 
Appeals 1991). 
B 
THE "REQUEST FOR HEARING" WAS FILED TIMELY 
IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PROVISIONS OF 
SECTION 63-37-1, UTAH CODE 
The Plaintiff's analysis, calculations and 
conclusion (of untimeliness) are further inappropriate 
and flawed when the provisions of Section 63-37-1, Utah 
Code, are considered, thus: 
Any report, claim, tax return, statement or 
other document or any payment required or 
authorized to be filed or made to the state of 
Utah, or to any political subdivision thereof, 
which is: 
(1) Transmitted through the United 
States mail, shall be deemed filed 
or made and received by the state or 
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political subdivision on the date 
shown by the post-office 
cancellation mark stamped upon the 
envelope or other appropriate 
wrapper containing it. 
(2) . . . [provisions pertaining to 
unreceived mailings] 
Emphasis added. Section 63-37-1 was in effect in 1997, 
at the times material hereto. [The provision has been 
renumbered (since 2000) and is now found at Section 68-
3-8.5, Utah Code, with slight text amendments.] 
The original envelope which would have shown the 
October 27th mailing was last in the custody of the 
Plaintiff WEST VALLEY CITY. If this were then (6 years 
ago) perceived to be such a dispositive issue upon 
which the City would have based its action, one would 
think the CITY would have preserved the envelope and 
such would be "in evidence" before the Court. The CITY 
didn't and the actual "postmarked" envelope isn't "in 
evidence".] In evidence is the "certificate of 
mailing", confirming the October 27th mailing date. 
That "certificate" at RECORD 00096 is the 
functional equivalent of the "postmark" on the envelope 
and should be sufficient documentation of the timely 
mailing. Thus, per the arithmetic calculations engaged 
in by Plaintiff's appellate counsel, the October 27th 
mailing is TIMELY! [As with all of the pre-trial 
discovery, the CITY actively resisted in cooperating, 
to disclose when the "request for hearing" might have 
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actually been "received" by the CITY itself, not merely 
the A.C.E. office. But such analysis is arguably "moot" 
in any event, given the statutory mandate of Section 
63-37-1, Utah Code which does explain and legitimize 
the position taken by the CITY'S trial attorney: that 
the date of mailing and/or "receipt" of the "request 
for hearing" was never an issue.] In accordance with 
the provisions of Section 63-37-1, Utah Code, the 
mailing is timely and Plaintiff's newly-fabricated 
assertions and conclusions (not presented to the trial 
court) to the contrary are meritless. 
II 
THE GENERALIZED ENABLING LEGISLATION 
OF SECTION 10-8-84, UTAH CODE 
DOES NOT OVERCOME THE SPECIFIC REQUIREMENTS 
OF SECTION 10-11-2, UTAH CODE, 
PERTAINING TO MUNICIPAL ENFORCEMENT ACTIVITIES 
INVOLVING "WEEDY LOTS" AND SIMILAR VIOLATIONS 
The Plaintiff-Appellant WEST VALLEY CITY argues 
[pp. 18-21 of APPELLEE'S BRIEF] that the generalized 
enabling legislation of Section 10-8-84, Utah Code, and 
the abolition of the so-called "Dillon's Rule" under 
the Utah Supreme Court's decision in the case of State 
vs Hutchinson, 624 P. 2d 1116 (Utah Supreme Court 1980) , 
entitles the CITY to disregard the statutory 
requirements of Section 10-11-2 et seq, Utah Code. Such 
is patently in error! 
That approach misreads both THE STATUTE (Section 
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10-8-84) and the Hutchinson decision. It is readily 
apparent that Section 10-8-84, Utah Code, is 
generalized legislation and is kind of a "catch-all 
enabling legislation". Over the decades, Section 10-8-
84 and its predecessor provisions have been relied 
upon to uphold municipal ordinances in the face of 
challenge, particular "Dillon's Rule"-type challenges. 
The fatal flaw of the CITY'S analysis is the simple 
fact that Section 10-8-84 was worded thus: 
They [cities, acting through their legislative 
governing bodies] may pass all ordinances and 
rules, and make all regulations, not repugnant 
to general law, necessary for . . . 
Emphasis added. Thus, the question arises: is the West 
Valley City A.C.E. program (and its foundational 
ordinance), in the "weedy lot" context, "repugnant to 
law" when the A.C.E. provisions are so diametrically 
opposed and antagonistic to provisions of state law 
SPECIFICALLY GOVERNING this subject, namely, Section 
10-11-1, Utah Code? 
Furthermore, Appellee CITY misreads the operational 
effect of the State vs Hutchinson decision. Without a 
doubt, Hutchinson repealed the so-called "Dillon's 
Rule" [which, briefly stated, proved for a narrowly-
construed, presumptively-disfavored judicial 
interpretation against municipal exercise of implied 
powers]. The issue here is not, per se, dealing with 
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"Dillon's Rule". That issue has been decided: 
correctly. The error the CITY makes is that Hutchinson, 
and the announced demise of "Dillon's Rule", are NOT 
intended and were NEVER intended as an "open the 
floodgates" liberalization that local governments could 
adopt anything they wanted! TO THE CONTRARY, the 
Supreme Court in Hutchinson expressly recognized that 
one of the appropriate reasons to then-abandon the 
anachronistic "Dillon's Rule" (which was for the most 
part a methodology of judicially-followed jurisprudence 
rather than a grant of legislative "enabling 
legislation") was the EXISTENCE OF CONSTITUTIONAL AND 
STATUTORY LIMITATIONS UPON THE EXERCISE OF POLICE 
POWERS BY LOCAL GOVERNMENT. This concept that 
municipalities are still subject to the LIMITING EFFECT 
of state statutes is made absolutely clear in 
Hutchinson, thus: 
There are ample safeguards against any abuse 
of power at the local level. Local 
governments, as subdivisions of the State, 
exercise those powers granted to them by the 
State Legislature, and the exercise of a 
delegated power is subject to the limitations 
imposed by state statutes and state and 
federal constitutions. 
624 P.2d at 1121. Emphasis added. Citation to cases 
omitted. 
Thus, the CITY'S analysis fails on both issues: 
Section 10-8-84 and all local government "rights" 
7 
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thereunder are subject to the "not repugnant to law" 
LIMITATION. Furthermore, Hutchinson, by its express 
reason, similarly RECOGNIZES THERE ARE LIMITATIONS 
which are placed upon municipalities BY OTHER STATUTES. 
The decision of the Utah Supreme Court in the case 
of Harding vs Alpine City, 656 P.2d 985 (Utah Supreme 
Court 1982) is illustrative and, arguably, dispositive. 
In Harding the municipality had attempted to require, 
by ordinance, the mandatory connection to the public 
sanitary sewer line if the occupied structure were 
located within 500 feet; state statute authorized 
municipalities to require the connection if within "300 
feet". In holding the municipal ordinance invalid, the 
Supreme Court noting the "not repugnant to law" 
provisions of Section 10-8-84 and the limitations 
expressed within Hutchinson correctly observed that 
were the municipality's position to be accepted, the 
"300 feet" LIMITATION (of the enabling legislation) 
would have no meaning. 
In this same context, if the CITY'S position to 
the effect that Section 10-8-84 and/or Hutchinson 
supersede and override the provisions of Section 10-11-
2 et seq---is accepted, then the EIGHT HUNDRED FIFTY-
SEVEN words of Sections 10-11-2 through 10-11-4 are 
effectively WRITTEN "OUT" OF THE STATUTE! 
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The City' s attempted justification of its ordinance 
simply fails. 
A 
PRINCIPLES OF STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION 
IN SITUATIONS OF CONFLICTING STATUTES 
The foregoing situation the interpretation and 
application of two arguably conflicting statutes 
invokes the long-standing, time-honored principle of 
statutory construction: 
IN THE INTERPRETATION AND APPLICATION OF TWO 
CONFLICTING STATUTES OF WHICH ONE STATUTE IS 
"GENERAL" IN NATURE AND THE OTHER IS 
"SPECIFIC"---THE PROVISIONS OF THE "SPECIFIC" 
STATUTE ARE CONTROLLING OVER THE PROVISIONS OF 
THE "GENERALIZED" STATUTE. Osuala vs Aetna 
Life & Casualty, 608 P.2d 242 (Utah Supreme 
Court 1980); Pan Energy vs Martin, 813 P.2d 
1142 (Utah Supreme Court 1991); Perry vs 
Pioneer Wholesale Supply, 681 P.2d 214 (Utah 
Supreme Court 1984); Forbes vs St Mark's 
Hospital, 754 P.2d 933 (Utah Supreme Court 
1988) ; State ex rel Public Service Commission 
vs Southern Pacific Company, 95 Utah 84, 79 
P. 2d 25 (Utah Supreme Court 1938) ; and Millett 
vs Clark Clinic Corp., 609 P.2d 934 (Utah 
Supreme Court 1980) [" [W]here the operation of 
two statutory provisions is in conflict, that 
provision which is more specific in its 
application will govern over that which is 
more general." 609 P.2d at 936-936]. 
It is readily apparent that the foregoing principle 
dictates that the interpretation and solution advanced 
by Plaintiff CITY cannot be sustained; rather, the 
provisions of Section 10-11-2 et seq, are controlling 
and the application of the CITY'S "administrative code 
enforcement" ordinance in this case (i.e. "weedy lot", 
9 
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deleterious objects, etc.) must fail.1 
Section 10-8-84 certainly is "general": a "catch-
all" as-it-were of "enabling legislation" to authorize 
municipalities "police powers", according to its terms. 
The statute is "general". It utilizes and contains the 
phrase "not repugnant to law": thus, by its own terms, 
10-8-84 recognizes there might be situations and 
applications which are controlled by other provisions 
of "law" (constitutions, federal statutes, and/or other 
state statutes). In essence, Section 10-8-84 recognizes 
and affirmatively "takes a back seat" to and in 
deference of those other provisions "the law" more 
specific and/or more controlling of the situation! 
The interpretation advanced by West Valley CITY 
would have the Court IGNORE the "not repugnant to law" 
LIMITATION contained within Section 10-8-84, Utah Code, 
and would invite the Court to IGNORE and overlook the 
500+ WORDS contained in Section 10-11-2 et seq. In this 
context, the Utah Supreme Court has written: 
"It is to be noted that 10-8-84, by its 
express terms, limits the grant of power to 
municipalities to pass ordinances, to those 
"not repugnant to law." 
Allgood vs Larsen, 545 P.2d at 531. Emphasis added.] 
lrThe CITY'S "administrative code enforcement" ordinance also 
applies to other situations (animal control, etc.). Those 
situations are not impacted (or invalidated) by the conflict with 
the provisions of Section 10-11-2 et seq. Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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The MANDATORY verb "SHALL" in describing the 
CITY'S duties and responsibilities is utilized in 
Sections 10-11-2 through 10-11-5 TWENTY-ONE TIMES, in 
a variety of contexts!. Obviously, the Legislature 
"advisedly" selecting that term and REPEATING ITS 
USAGE intended the MANDATORY PERFORMANCE OF THE 
STATED OBLIGATION. [This must be contrasted with the 
one-time usage of the permissive "may" (in the context 
of adoption of ordinances, etc.) in Section 10-8-84.] 
The CITY points out correctly that Section 10-
11-1 utilizes the verb "may" (appoint inspectors). This 
is correct. Had the Legislature utilized the term 
"shall" (appoint inspectors), that result would have 
violated the Utah Constitution. See State ex rel Wright 
vs Standford, 24 Utah 148, 66 Pac. 1061 (1901) [state 
statute mandating appointment of county fruit tree 
inspectors violated Article XIII, Section 5 of the Utah 
Constitution (providing for local control of municipal 
budgets and finances)]. But IF the municipality is 
going to interact with the propertyowner i.e. "clean 
up your yard" then the municipality MUST ACT IN THE 
MANNER DESIGNATED BY THE LEGISLATURE in statute: 
namely, by the procedures established in Section 10-11-
2 et seq. West Valley City's approach to the effect 
that "we're going to do it our own way" contravenes 
1 i 
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the STATUTE: BOTH IN ORDINANCE and in result! The 
CITY'S argument that the A.C.E. program is simply "an 
alternative means of accomplishing the same result" [p. 
21 of APPELLEE'S BRIEF] doesn't work! 
The instant judicial decision affirming that 
invalid result and affirming that invalid ordinance 
must be clearly reversed! 
•B 
MUNICIPAL ORDINANCES ADOPTED IN 
PROCEDURAL OR SUBSTANTIVE CONTRAVENTION 
TO STATE STATUTE ARE INVALID 
City ordinances not adopted in compliance with 
statutory procedural requirements are invalid and void 
ab initio. Call vs West Jordan City, 727 P. 2d 180 (Utah 
Supreme Court 1986) ["Failure to strictly follow the 
statutory requirements in enacting the ordinance 
renders it invalid . . . and void ab initio." 727 P.2d 
at 182-183 . ] 
County governments have also been subjected to this 
result. Melville vs Salt Lake County, 536 P. 2d 133 
(Utah Supreme Court 1975) [county zoning ordinance 
invalid because of county's failure to follow statutory 
requirements of notice and publication]. 
See also Toone vs Weber County, 2002 Ut App 103, 
57 P. 3d 1079 (Utah Supreme Court 2002) [county's 
purported sale of real estate not in compliance with 
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statutory procedures invalidated and set aside]. 
Local governments are without authority to pass any 
ordinance prohibited by, or in conflict with, state 
statutory law. Salt Lake City vs Allred, 20 Utah 2d 
298, 437 P.2d 434 (1968) . City ordinance prescribing a 
greater penalty for trespass than was provided for in 
the state criminal code is invalid. See Allgood vs 
Larson, 545 P.2d 530 (Utah 1976) [holding "Salt Lake 
City seeks to exceed the public policy declared by the 
legislature relating to a new class of offense. It 
does not have that power of amendment." 545 P. 2d at 
532.] In the instant case, Plaintiff WEST VALLEY CITY 
seeks to impose upon Defendant FOY, for her "weedy 
lot", an administratively-assessed "fine" of ALMOST 
SEVEN THOUSAND DOLLARS, from a situation in which the 
City incurred essentially no clean-up costs. Under the 
provisions of Section 10-11-2, Utah Code, the City's 
recovery would be limited to recovery of its actual 
costs in the clean-up! Thus, per Allgood, the City's 
attempt to have a higher "penalty" than allowed by 
statute for the "weedy lot" invalidates the A.C.E. 
ordinance. See also Smith vs Hyde, 97 Utah 280, 92 P. 2d 
1098 (1939) [municipal ordinance invalid due to penalty 
in excess of that allowed by state statute]. 
The CITY's A.C.E. ordinance program in the "weedy 
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lot" context being in conflict with overriding 
statute must simply fail! 
Ill 
THE CITY'S FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH THE MANDATORY 
PROVISIONS OF ITS ORDINANCES GRANTING TO 
DEFENDANT FOY THE "RIGHT" TO A HEARING 
IS CONTROLLING MORESO THAN THE "AGENCY" ISSUE 
The CITY'S Brief argues [pp. 11-13] that it was 
incumbent upon the Defendant FOY to establish the 
"apparent authority" of her "agent(s)" e.g. "Renter 
K Cooper and/or former husband Jim Decker" in sending 
to the CITY the "request for hearing" letter. This 
disingenuous and "intellectually dishonest" argument 
cannot honored as the District Court did as the 
basis for entry of the summary judgment against 
Defendant FOY. 
The District Court in its "Memorandum Decision" 
acknowledged the factual disputes inherent in an 
"agency" context, but nevertheless went on to rule 
against Defendant FOY. On this narrow issue, the CITY 
did not submit one shred of "sworn testimony" to 
support its claims (i.e. no "agency"), let alone to 
contradict Ms FOY's assertions [See DEPOSITION OF 
TERESA FOY, page 6. RECORD at 00579, and AFFIDAVIT OF 
JAMES DECKER, RECORD at 000091-000095] that Jim Decker 
was her "agent" and that Decker mailed the "request: for 
hearing" document to the CITY, for the purpose of 
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obtaining the "hearing"! 
Against that backdrop (of the CITY'S failure to 
submit even one shred of sworn evidence to the 
contrary) is coupled the very "request for hearing" 
document itself, against the generalized framework of 
the CITY'S own ordinance, thus: 
1. The "request for hearing" document 
doesn't just "fall unexpectedly out of the 
sky", but rather is sent to the exact office 
to which the CITY'S "notice of violation" 
directs the mailing. 
2. The "request for hearing" document is 
received by the CITY in a timely manner: 
within the "ten-day period" established by the 
"notice of violation" sent to Ms FOY in 
southern Utah. The "request" wasn't "early" 
nor was it "late"; the "request" was 
expectedly "right on time"! [Absent some 
kind of "authorization" from Defendant FOY, 
the factual arrival of the "request" cannot be 
construed to be mere coincidence or surprise 
to the CITY or its personnel.] 
3. The "request for hearing" CORRECTLY 
REFERS to the West Valley City A.C.E. "case 
file number" [i.e. 97-5215], and ties that 
1 c; 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
case number to the property address in 
question. [Again, who else but an "authorized 
agent" in apparent contact with Ms FOY in 
southern Utah would have coincidentally been 
privy to that information, particularly within 
a very narrow time-frame?] 
4. The "request for hearing" CORRECTLY 
REFERS to Ms FOY's then-current residence in 
southern Utah as so known by CITY personnel. 
5. The "request for hearing" document was 
"filed" in the City's case file for the 
"Teresa Foy case". 
6. The CITY, in response thereto, initially 
scheduled the hearing on the "Foy case". See 
JAMES DECKER AFFIDAVIT, %1, RECORD at 000093. 
7. The CITY "switched" the hearings. [See 
AFFIDAVIT OF JAMES DECKER, ^7; RECORD at 
00093.] The CITY has acknowledged that a 
hearing WAS HELD see CITY'S Memorandum of 
Law in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment, 
p. 2, HH9-14. RECORD at 000035-000036. This 
statement that a hearing was held, is 
mistaken and disingenuous on the CITY'S part. 
The hearing that was held concerned "the Jim 
Decker case", which just a few days earlier 
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had been "opened". [At this early stage in the 
litigation, the CITY and its attorney hadn't 
really solidified its position, even though 
the City's MEMORANDUM characterizes the 
situation as "undisputed facts". The 
MEMORANDUM does correctly note that the 
propertyowner was Defendant FOY, per the 
administrative hearing officer's findings. But 
the "hearing officer" was simply wrong, 
because the propertyowner was Lancer, 
Incorporated a fact eventually recognized 
and accepted by the CITY later in the 
litigation.] 
Against these sworn statements, the CITY provided NO 
SWORN EVIDENCE IN REBUTTAL. Those "facts" (and the 
inferences therefrom) must be measured against the 
City's own ordinance, thus: 
1. The CITY'S ordinance (and the "notice of 
violation") document clearly state numerous 
times that the opportunity for the "hearing" 
is a "right". 
2. The CITY'S ordinance utilizes the 
mandatory term "shall" in the context that 
when the Director receives the "request for 
hearing", the Director shall schedule the 
1 7 
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hearing. There is NO REQUIREMENT that the 
"request" be signed. There is NO REQUIREMENT 
as to any particular "format" for the 
"request", except that it be in writing. Thus, 
although the "Renter K Cooper" origin 
although arguably unexplained at first blush--
-might be simply ignored, the "bottom line" to 
the document simply CANNOT BE IGNORED: to the 
effect THAT A HEARING WAS REQUESTED! 
3. The CITY'S ordinance expressly makes an 
"agent" or "lessee" [see "definition" of 
"person", WVC Municipal Code, §10-1-110(r)] 
and "tenant", "person with a Legal Interest in 
real property", and "person in possession of 
real property" to be a "Responsible Person" 
tenant" [see "definition" of "responsible 
person", WVC Municipal Code, §10-1-110(u)]. 
Thus, facially, the "request for hearing" from 
"Renter K Cooper" complied with the ordinance! 
The CITY'S staff had no discretion to 
disregard it. 
4. Furthermore, because the CITY'S own 
ordinance [WVC Municipal Code, §10-1-110(u), 
pertaining to "responsible person"] authorized 
the CITY ostensibly on the basis of evidence 
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to be derived within the "hearing" context 
to "determine" WHO MIGHT BE a "responsible 
person", as that person "responsible for 
causing or maintaining [the] violation", it 
was expected certainly by FOY hundreds of 
miles away and having no part in the 
violations that those persons "responsible" 
for the claimed "violations" should be able to 
request a "hearing". 
5. Lastly, the CITY somewhat at odds with 
its own pleading [see ^3 of the Complaint, 
RECORD at 000002] alleging that Defendant FOY 
is the owner of the 0.15-acre parcel (which 
she was) has, within the course of the 
litigation, adopted the position that she is 
also PERSONALLY RESPONSIBLE FINANCIALLY for 
those violations committed or present upon the 
Lancer, Incorporated parcel! [The CITY ought 
not be allowed to "split hairs" on the 
"agency" issue (vis-a-vis the "request for 
hearing") and then paint Ms FOY's personal 
liability "with a broad brush" as concerning 
the "corporate parcel's" violations!] The 
CITY'S position ignores the fact that a 
corporation can act only through its agents 
1 9 
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AND that the "lion's share" of the 
"violations" were NOT LOCATED on the "Foy 
parcel", but were rather located on the 
"Lancer, Incorporated parcel" to the south! 
It is "black-letter law" [Rule 56(c) and countless 
appellate court decisions] that summary judgment is 
proper in cases where there is no genuine issue of 
material fact and the moving party is entitled to a 
judgment as a matter of law. In cases where the facts 
are in dispute, summary judgment is only granted when, 
viewing the facts in a light most favorable to the 
party opposing summary judgment, the moving party is 
entitled to judgment. In this "summary judgment" 
context the Utah Supreme Court has observed that 
"the facts are to be liberally construed in 
favor of the parties opposing the motion, and 
those parties are to be given the benefit of 
all inferences which might reasonably be drawn 
from the evidence." 
Payne ex rel Payne vs Myers, 743 P. 2d 186 at 187-88 
(Utah Supreme Court 1987). Emphasis added. See also 
Clover vs Snowbird Ski Resort, 808 P. 2d 1037 (Utah 
Supreme Court 1991) and Owens vs Garfield, 784 P. 2d 
1187 (Utah Supreme Court 1989). 
Given the sworn statements of the Defendant before 
the Court, "all inferences which might reasonably be 
drawn" therefrom (Payne, supra), and the CITY'S own 
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LACK OF SWORN STATEMENTS, "summary judgment" against 
Defendant FOY was most improper and must be reversed. 
IV 
THE "PETITION FOR REVIEW" JUDICIAL REMEDY 
CLAIM IS INCORRECTLY APPEALED 
On appeal, the CITY has raised [pp. 16-18 of 
APPELLEE'S BRIEF] FOR THE FIRST TIME an issue not 
presented to and considered by the District Court2: 
that FOY "failed to exhaust her administrative 
remedies" in failing to file a timely "petition for 
2
 The District Court' s ruling based upon FOY' s " failure 
to exhaust her administrative remedies", focused upon the 
Court's analysis that FOY had failed to "request" the 
"hearing". The District Court, in reasoning and justifying the 
grant of summary judgment in favor of Appellee CITY and 
against Appellant FOY, reasoned that FOY had "failed to 
exhaust her administrative remedies". The apparent factual 
basis for that ruling was the District Court's incorrectly-
concluded conclusion that FOY "personally" had not requested 
the hearing. 
In concluding that Defendant FOY had "failed to exhaust 
her administrative remedies", the District Court applied 
statutory standards found in the Utah Administrative 
Procedures Act [hereinafter "UAPA"], codified at 63-46b-l et 
seq, Utah Code. The provisions of the UAPA generally, and 
specifically the "exhaustion" requirements cited by the 
District Court, are INAPPLICABLE to the instant situation, by 
reason of a careful reading of the "definition" provisions of 
the UAPA [Section 63-46b-2, Utah Code], thus: 
(1) As used in this chapter: 
(b) "Agency" means a board, commission, 
... of this state . . . but does not mean ... 
any political subdivision of the state... 
Emphasis added. Thus, the Plaintiff WEST VALLEY CITY as a 
political subdivision of the State of Utah is not an 
"agency" [for UAPA purposes] and the "exhaustion of 
administrative remedies" provisions of 63-46b-14, Utah Code, 
as expressly relied upon by the District Court are erroneous. 
o-i 
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review" with the District Court immediately following 
conclusion of the A.C.E. administrative proceeding. The 
CITY asserts FOY is precluded now from asserting any 
"defenses" or claims within this judicial proceeding 
filed by the CITY. 
Much like the claimed "untimeliness" of the 
"request for hearing" as shown above to be "timely" 
in any event the City's "exhaustion of administrative 
remedies" argument HEREIN RAISED FOR THE FIRST TIME "ON 
APPEAL", must be neither countenanced nor recognized. 
This argument that FOY didn't file a "petition for 
review" in the District Court was NOT presented to 
the District Court and the District Court did not rule 
thereon! Accordingly, such is improperly raised for the 
first time on appeal. See Dansie, supra; Wurst, supra; 
and Olson, supra. See also Broberg vs Hess, 782 P.2d 
198 (Utah Court of Appeals) [where there is no 
indication in the record on appeal that the trial court 
reached or ruled on an issue, the Court of Appeals will 
not undertake to consider the issue on appeal]. 
There is also an unconscionable unfairness with the 
City's position. First, that position ostensibly 
arising from the provisions of its own ordinances, 
which in the "weedy lot" context may be invalid as 
being "repugnant to law" (i.e. Section 10-11-2 et seq) -
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--ought not defeat and restrict consideration of FOY's 
pleaded "defenses". Section 10-11-2 et seq wouldn't 
have made FOY incur the expense of filing a "district 
court case" to challenge the municipality's 
determinations (as to clean-up costs, etc.) . Secondly, 
the CITY'S own ordinances characterize the "petition 
for review" by utilizing the permissive term "may". 
Thirdly, those same ordinances characterize the 
"petition for review" as a "judicial" remedy, as 
contrasted with an "administrative" remedy. So, in the 
"common law" jurisprudence as herein applied, she 
hasn't failed to exhaust her "administrative" remedies 
by failing to seek the "judicial" remedy. [The CITY 
not Ms FOY selected the terms it utilized in the 
Ordinance.] There is unfairness and lack of "mutuality" 
in the result if the CITY'S position is accepted to 
the effect that FOY must appeal to the District Court 
(through the "petition for review"), or else she loses 
ALL HER RIGHTS.3 It is patently unfair to take the 
position as the CITY does that FOY loses all her 
opportunity to "defend" against THE JUDICIAL ACTION THE 
CITY HAS NOW FILED AGAINST HER! Defendant FOY ought to 
3It is speculative, for sure, but one must wonder what the 
CITY'S position would be within the "petition for review" 
proceeding, had such been actually filed with the District Court. 
Would the CITY be asserting the Defendant as petitioner 
couldn't raise the issues she has herein raised? If such wouldn't 
be the CITY'S position, then what is the problem? 
23 
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be able to raise and litigate all the "defenses" she 
has pleaded. [The District Court's grant of summary 
judgment essentially (implicitly) ruled, as a matter of 
law, that all those "defenses" were invalid and/or 
ineffective. ] 
The CITY, by ordinance, cannot ESTABLISH OR 
RESTRICT THE JURISDICTION OF THE DISTRICT COURT by the 
provisions of the municipality's own ordinance! In 
similar vein, the CITY cannot, through such ordinance, 
side-step and circumvent in an almost "reverse 
bootstrapping" setting appropriate "judicial review" 
of the very ordinances Defendant FOY seeks to have 
declared invalid. If the CITY'S A.C.E. ordinance is 
invalid for example, as contradicting Section 10-11-
2, Utah Code then the "exhaustion" requirements of 
that same ordinance are similarly invalid and of no 
effect. The CITY cannot "short-circuit" the process 
through these claims and thus deny the Defendant the 
opportunity to defend. In the face of those "defenses", 
the CITY was not "entitled to judgment as a matter of 
law" and summary judgment should NOT have been entered. 
CONCLUSION 
The District Court erred in granting summary 
judgment against Defendant FOY, when so many of the 
necessary "facts" were "in genuine dispute": 
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particularly, when a "request for hearing" had been 
TIMELY FILED. The "agency" arguments advanced by the 
City distracted the District Court from the material 
analysis of the problem: the mandatory provisions of 
the CITY'S own ordinances (requiring a hearing be 
scheduled AND HELD). 
The CITY'S "code enforcement procedures" 
(ostensibly authorizing "administrative fines") when in 
fact the CITY incurred no actual expenses in the clean-
up of the parcel(s), contradicts the detailed and 
binding guidelines and requirements of Section 10-11-1 
et seq, Utah Code, properly pleaded as a "defense" and 
which should have been overcome before summary judgment 
could have been entered. 
The judgment of the District Court should be and 
must be reversed. 
Respectfully submitted this 17th day of February, 
2004. v . /? 
I certify that I caused TWO COPIES of the foregoing 
APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF to be mailed, first-class 
postage prepaid, to Mr J Richard Catten, Attorney at 
Law, Office of the West Valley City Attorney, West 
Valley City Corporation, 3600 South Constitution 
Boulevard, West Valley City, Utah 84119, this 17th day 
of February, 2004. 
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